Jingoism, Rogues’ Galleries and Damning with Faint Praise.

White House photo by Eric Draper
In the wake of Moammar Gadhafi’s demise, the question du jour quickly became why can’t President Obama’s opponents concede him credit for the United States’ role in the former Libyan leader’s downfall?
Indeed, in the strictest sense, as Commander-in-Chief Mr Obama has neutralized a virtual rouges’ gallery in just a few short months, either in whole or part. Gadhafi joined Osama bin Laden, Anwar al-Alaki, and several top al-Qaeda lieutenants since bin Laden’s death last May. If to wage war were his only duty, Mr Obama would deserve credit for decisive action in these instances.
What is troubling are how these successes and their handling play into the greater context of this presidency and the psyche of the country. Much of the past decade has been an ongoing debate about the costs and effectiveness of the neoconservative policy of intervention as it has been embodied during the war on terror. It has been the most serious and intense examination of American jingoism and nation-building since the Vietnam era, perhaps even in all of the post World War Two epoch.
We also have had fierce debate on the treatment of “unlawful enemy combatants” and what degree of due process we should afford them, the line challenging what does and does not constitute proper warfare and the rule of law, made infamous by the issues of water-boarding and the indefinite detaining of untried prisoners are facilities such as GITMO.
Frankly, after a decade of nebulous war and military action coupled with economic malaise, the appeal of continuing this mindset has waned to an unprecedented level. Saying a considerable portion of the Right, easily the more hawkish of the two major political camps, would join with the Left’s long held tenant of military restraint in foreign policy is no exaggeration and evidence of a major ideological victory if it were to hold. And this is where the trouble with Mr Obama’s recent success begins.
It is nigh impossible to reconcile that on the cusp of such a shift in attitude we are engaging in what seems to be in so many ways the epitome of jingoism and nation-building. There is really no way to properly describe it than in those terms, regardless of how might feel about the acts themselves. Libya, no matter how noble the end result, was an intervention in a civil war. We chose a side and supported them in overt military action. The hunt for bin Laden, no matter the strategic or visceral satisfaction, saw us cross the sovereign borders of a declared ally without prior warning or request, seriously damaging relations with Pakistan.
Anwar al-Alaki’s slaying via a Hellfire missile launched from a Predator drone is forever muddied by the fact that he was born in the United States, making a strong case that his rights under the Constitution were not merely a hypothetical courtesy but a point of law. Whatever we may say of his status at the time of his death, the act of summery justice that ended his life utterly tarnished the validity of that discourse of extending due process to those captured if they cannot be respected in this instance.
Did the effective courses of action have degrees of merit or necessity due to tactical expediency? Probably. But to concede that returns us to the argument of neoconservatism and the Bush Doctrine that an aggressive foreign relations posture is the first, best policy when it comes to the war on terror. This would not be a problem if the Obama campaign and election were not seen as a virtual repudiation of the previous administration, something made incarnate by Mr Obama’s winning of the Nobel Peace Prize based almost exclusively on speculation of a shift in attitude away from this type of behavior.
If we are to be admonished with reminders of “who we are not”, as Mr Obama is often apt to do, then we must define who we are in the face of that admonishment. Do we build nations by blindly choosing sides, not truly knowing what vacuums of power we are creating, simply to spite the “devil we know”? Are our successes and effectiveness based on the surgical precision of method, or careful consideration of the factors and circumstance unique to each case? Does the budget of life and treasure, weighed against these questions, truly spell a more intelligent prosecution of warfare if so many long-term factors are left in play?
Do we begrudgingly award the de facto victory lap Mr Obama’s supporters demand based simply on how these numbers sit with us, our own attitudes now to be held static instead of evolving as the events and arguments of the past decade tempered them?
Is that who we are? Applauding efficient ratios while the results and the weight of our own conscience and values remain in flux?
Indeed, President Obama may have “out-Bushed” President Bush, but the path and questions left in the wake of that pursuit of policy merely reinforces everything that the Barack Obama of 2008 was to herald the end of. Instead of an argument won, instead of major ideological victories for the Left, we now see neoconservatism not defeated, but in full flower.






Interesting thoughts on Iraq and the divide between tactics and strategy when it comes to nation building by Charles Krauthammer. Maybe we should hold up on that victory lap for a bit yet.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/who-lost-iraq/2011/11/03/gIQAUcUqjM_story.html
I will read up on this. Thank you for sharing.